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It is the curse of intelligence agencies that their successes must remain hidden and that their 
failures are widely publicized. Nonetheless, intelligence failures are inevitable.: Iit is 
impossible to predict the future, so ultimately forecasting on threats remains guesswork. 
However, lLessons learned from the past  however, enable us to identify certain mistakes that 
have contributed to intelligence failures (Gill & Pythian, 2012, 169), mistakes that many 
times originated from psychological mind-sets. As such they act as impediments
2
 to the 
overall intelligence effort and are common causes of failures. With the benefit of hindsight 
(Omand, 2010, p. 239), attempts have been made to identify them (Bar-Joseph & 
McDermott, 2010, pp. 366-372; Goodman, 2007, pp. 529-551; Heuer, 1999, pp. 161-170; 
Marrin, 2004, pp. 655-672), and in so doing so tentative solutions can be put forward to help 
prevent these mistakes from further contaminating the intelligence process. 
 
Intelligence services are organizations for human beings, of human beings, and by human 
beings: they are therefore fallible and mistakes will happen. Typically human thought 
processes, first impressions, prejudices, disagreements and a whole range of other 
shortcomings interact to impede the intelligence effort. Rarely one sets to work on a 
particular problem with an open mind; certain perceptions very easily dominate the view that 
is taken (Heuer, 1999). The ability to detect the out-of-the-ordinary is usually blurred by the 
change-resistant cognitive patterns employed by analysts to make sense of large amounts of 
information: “… analysts become acclematizedacclimatized and such intelligence as may be 
produced is hard to accept since it would involve those concerned in being prepared to admit 
that things will change” (Omand, 2010, pp. 212-213; ) (Heuer, 1999, 5-6, 10; Honig, 2007, 
706 Omand, 2010, 225-226). Eventually that results in generalizations, predetermined beliefs 
and a biased approach, with mistaken assumptions as a consequence that can be detrimental 
to security (Betts, 2007, 22-23, 54-59; Heuer, 1999, 111-160). Organizational culture can 
also lead to subconscious thought patterns that stand in the way of getting to the right 
judgement or convincing the policy maker – often impeded by path dependence – to act upon 
it (Betts, 2007, 11-14, 24-27). And then, for certain policy priorities good intelligence is only 
regarded as that which supports those priorities (Betts, 15, 19; Lowenthal, 2012, 202-207, 
Marrin, 2004, 660, 665). That also makes it clear that the impediments affect both producers 
and consumers of intelligence (Gill & Pythian, 2012, 149). Policy-makers might find 
themselves comforted in denial of certain clear facts or are unwilling to act upon sound 
intelligence, hampered as they are by budgetary constraints or fear of burning one’s fingers 
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on sounding an unnecessary alarm (Betts, 2007, 25-37). Warning fatigue is a dangerous 
psychological impediment, for there is no way of knowing whether acting upon the warning 
was useless or led to the adversary’s postponement of their plans, while the analyst or 
decision-maker is held responsible for causing a great deal of – often very costly – trouble 
because of a threat that failed to materialize. Anticipation can make or break careers, and 
concern for one’s job can severely cloud one’s judgement. 
 
There is an ongoing debate whether these impediments can be overcome or not. In this debate 
two schools of thought are opposite one another: revisionists tend to believe solutions are 
possible, while those of the orthodox line of thought hold the fatalist approach that little can 
be done to remedy these shortcomings in intelligence analysis (Honig 2007, 699-716). But 
lessons of the past, while perhaps confirming the orthodox view, offer the inherent means to 
adjust the intelligence process in order to improve and make the professionals conscious of 
their limitations. Scholarly research makes it clear that a sufficient amount of safeguards can 
be implemented to try and circumvent the obvious psychological traps inherent to analysis 
(sSee for instance the recommendations by Heuer, 1999, 16; Marrin, 2011; Marrin, 2004, 
668-669). Much has been said in this regard about dissenting opinions, devil’s advocacy, 
exceptional thinking and other reforms (Betts, 2007, 37-52; Marrin, 2004, 664-665) that can 
help to critically reflect on the mental processes by which (mis)perceptions form. At the core 
of most recommendations is the virtue of mixing expertise with generalism: “specialization 
encourages rivalry and restriction of information, as each unit becomes a guardian of its own 
mission, standards, and skills.” (Honig, 2007, 708). Experts can get lost in their own superior 
knowledge of the subject and fail to see an obvious trait of the problem they are trying to 
analyse or try to uphold the importance of their field even though this could deflect attention 
from more pertinent issues. Some argue that a non-specialist look can help to change the 
perspective and is a key element to separating the wheat from the chaff (Gill & Pythian, 
2012, 105; Omand 2010, 225; Betts 2007, 53-65). 
 
Improving the quality of intelligence analysis is the key to avoid intelligence failures as much 
as possible. Analytical mind-sets have been recognized as one of the main causes of 
intelligence being analysed wrongly and ever since much effort has been undertaken in both 
scholarly and tradecraft literature to find the best ways of being conscious of these 
psychological impediments and how to overcome them (Hoffman, Henderson, Moon, Moore 
& Litman, 2011, 226-228; Pherson, 2009, 1-8; George, 2004, 387-393; Treverton & Fishbein, 
2004, 1-10). In order to achieve this the US intelligence community has developed a number 
of Structured Analytical Techniques (SATs), which “externalize and decompose our thinking 
in a manner that enables it to be reviewed and critiqued piece by piece, or step by step, by 
other knowledgeable analysts.” (Heuer, 2008, 3). As such “they help analysts overcome one 
or more of the well-known human cognitive limitations or pitfalls that inhibit effective 
analysis.” (Heuer, 2008, 4) The many difficulties of intelligence analysis require a number of 
techniques to cope with them: SATs are foremost in current tradecraft (Hoffman et al., 2011, 
228-236). These techniques can consist of one or more intellectual exercises in thinking that 
challenge the views held so far or can stimulate the formation of new hypotheses. Most SATs 
have apparent diagnostic value in their method and consequences and all lead to key 
examination of the evidence – so important to improved intelligence analysis (Heuer, 1999, 
183). In what is certainly not an exhaustive list, they are as follows (Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2009, 7-36; Pherson, 2009, 2-6; George, 2004, 394-398): 
 Key Assumptions Check: analysts identify key assumptions and their bases. In this 
way the argumentation behind the conclusions becomes clear, which allows critical 
reflection and validation. 
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 Quality of Information Check: review of sources and their strengths and weaknesses, 
possibly by means of a database that can be used for future reference. 
 Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (Heuer, 2007, 1-5): developing a matrix of 
alternative hypotheses against which the evidence is weighed so the most likely 
conclusion can be identified and deception detected. 
 Devil’s Advocacy: challenging conventional wisdom and formulating an alternative 
explanation, which either confirms the analytical view or invites rethinking it. 
 Team A/Team B: two opposing sides lay out their divergent hypotheses and describe 
how the data supports their conclusions. This invites reflection on the logic of the 
conclusions and allows for the view of all sides on important issues. 
 Red Team Analysis: thinking as the adversary. Main achievement of this technique is 
the prevention of mirror-imaging but is subject to great knowledge about the 
adversary in order to translate oneself into the red team’s culture. 
 Contingency Analysis: ‘‘what if?” analysis, focuses on the possible causes and 
consequences of an unlikely event. It is useful when information is limited, by 
thinking about how something can happen rather than if. 
 High Impact=Low Probability Analysis: analysts look for domestic and international 
factors that could lead to an unlikely event that would have huge consequences. It can 
lead up to a collection of indicators that can provide early warning. 
 Scenario Analysis (Alternative Futures): exploring possible outcomes by developing a 
matrix of possible alternative scenarios. It allows imagining what might happen and 
what the best responses could be. It could lead to better preparedness for when the 
analysis might prove wrong. 
 
In abstract thinking on intelligence, SATs seem excellent tools to work with, but intelligence 
is needed in the real world and is therefore of little use in the abstract (Stack, 1997, 463). 
Despite the theoretical appeal SATs are not ultimate intelligence tools: “no approach, however 
fresh, could make the inherent difficulty of the cognitive work go away.” (Hoffman et al.al., 
2011, 236). It can also be said that no approach will remedy it either. Intelligence is and will 
always be a matter for the human mind(s). The level of expertise required for some of these 
techniques could prove difficult to achieve – indeed, one could say a ‘Quality of Information 
Check’ is needed first for some of them –, neither will every professional be convinced of the 
virtues of employing these techniques (George, 2004, 400). 
 
However, the main problem with the above techniques is the same problem that leads to so 
many intelligence failures (Pherson, 2009): time and resources (Gill & Pythian, 2012, 109; 
George, 2004, 401; Marrin, 2002, 10; Stack, 1997, 458). In a real time crisis when 
preparedness and rapid reaction is of the essence, time is a luxury intelligence and decision 
do not have. Unfortunately, arguing about hypotheses and checking them, through, for 
example, ACH, takes a lot of time. But when a highly volatile situation develops somewhere, 
every minute counts and so they should not be spent on counsel, not debate. Time constraints 
and the need to act fast also have their bearing on the consumption of intelligence. While 
many might appreciate the “more thoughtful, comprehensive analysis” (Pherson, 2009, 7) 
SATs produce, not all policy makers consider themselves well served by this argumentative 
kind of intelligence (George, 2004, 399; Stack, 1997, 459-460): they want facts, not an 
academic seminar with contrary views and an outline of different possible outcomes. The 
consequence of the urgency of a situation that unfolds before our very eyes, is summed up 
perfectly by Richard Russell when he outlines this as a major obstacle to effective analysis: 
 
4 
“Political-military analysts working on conflicts are often peppered with daily and even 
hourly tasking for the production of current intelligence. They simply do not have the luxury 
of time needed to sit back, read, and think more broadly about strategic intelligence 
problems to develop even a common wisdom, much less alternative analyses. The immediate 
always takes precedence over the “nice to have,” the category into which competitive and 
alternative analysis falls among working level analysts.” (Russell, 2012, 383) 
 
A short deadline makes it very understandable there is such sparing use made of analytic 
techniques in intelligence communities (Gannon, 2008, 223). 
 
When time is not an issue, for long-term analysis, the techniques have great value. Not only 
for producing the most thought-through intelligence, but also because of the cognitive 
processes analysts go through when making use of SATs. Imagination and creative thinking 
(Heuer, 1999; Marrin, 2012) are at the core of SATs, not prediction. “The reported findings 
are not always judged as insightful as the critical thinking that went into the process.” 
(George, 2004, 400). The stimulating effects of the exercise are therefore of greater value 
than its possible ad hoc outcome. Having had experience of, but without using ACH, an 
analyst might construe a hypothesis in such a way as making it able to withstand its test. The 
same goes for any other sat the analyst might hold at the back of the mind. So while it might 
be cumbersome to subject analytic thinking to these techniques – in some cases even 
counterproductive – they could provide a subconscious framework wherein the 
abovementioned checks on hypotheses are employed, and so they are conducive to better 
methodology and self-critique (Heuer, 1999, 109; Heuer, 2008, 6-9; Marrin, 2012, 35). The 
end result is better intelligence. 
 
As awareness of the many flaws inherent to human thinking and analysing is raised, critical 
attitudes can be adopted and will lead to producers and consumers towards being 
introspective and self-conscious about the work they are doing or that lays before them (Gill 
& Pythian, 2012, 200; Heuer, 1999, 5). Such attitudes are the main ingredients of making 
intelligence as little imperfect as can be. This is done by “self-awareness, training and good 
management” (Omand, 2010, 249); increasing (international) co-operation and 
interdepartmental exchange might also be conducive to the process (Omand, 2010, 15). 
Although most will remain classified for a long time, it can be assumed that intelligence 
successes surmount intelligence failures (Betts, 2007, 21; Gentry, 2012). But it is not always 
possible to piece the puzzle together in time (Marrin, 2012, 21-23; Marrin, 2004, 659; 
Omand, 2010, 239-240;). It is equally wrong to believe it can than it is to assume there is 
nothing that can be done to improve the effort. The ball will be dropped from time to time, 
but it always stays in court. Freedom from mind-sets means engaging the very difficult task 
of applying methods of critical thinking without getting lost in imagination and argument. 
Intelligence will remain at its best if those working for it and with it are very well aware of 
their fallacy and are willing to do something about it (George, 2004, 402; Marrin, 2012). 
Structural analytic techniques provide some excellent tools to do that. 
 
It all comes down to one’s way of thinking. Analysis is, as Stephen Marrin has noted, far 
more about structured intuition than about structured analytic techniques (Marrin, 2007, 7-
16.) Therefore intelligence analysts must, like historians, be at times psychologists. Not just 
to understand their adversary, but also because the effect of their warning depends on their 
ability to understand their political masters and their response to the warning. Empathy, 
openness, and feedback are keywords here, and Betts’ recommendation for a ‘Socratic 
dialogue’ (Betts, 2007, 51; ) (Omand, 2010, 249) could be helpful in this respect to improve 
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the way policy-makers think about what they can expect from intelligence. In order for such 
an interaction to occur, a careful balance must be found between having a close relationship 
between producers and consumers without running the risk of politicization (Marrin, 2004, 
667). Above all, anyone who comes in contact with intelligence must be very well aware of 
the many limits facing the intelligence effort and therefore know what is realistic to expect 
and what is not (Honig, 2007, 712-713; Omand, 2010, 243). And in the pursuit of the set 
goals, it is essential to think freely and keep an open mind. Either could adopt as a working 
motto what Beatrice told Dante in Paradise: 
 
Apri la mente a quel ch’io ti paleso 
E fermalvi entro; ché non fa scienza 
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